From Component to Culture: A New Model for Risk

A: The conventional wisdom with Quantitative Risk Analyses, or QRAs, is that they offer a static snapshot, right? A picture of risk at a fixed moment.

B: Yes, traditionally they're seen as foundational design documents. But the real world of operations is anything but static, especially with ongoing organizational changes.

A: Precisely. That's the core problem a SINTEF report, STF38 A00422, by Knut Øien and Snorre Sklet, highlights. It argues these static assessments often miss the evolving risk during the operational phase.

B: So, how do they propose to bridge that gap? What are these dynamic "risk influencing factors" they're tracking?

A: The project aimed to quantify and continuously monitor how organizational factors specifically impact hydrocarbon leakage frequency. Their case study was the Statfjord A platform. So these "risk influencing factors" are essentially the underlying organizational mechanisms that dynamically reshape the actual risk landscape during operations.

A: Moving from that broad concept of dynamic risk, let's really zoom in on how this methodology deconstructs a leak to identify its root causes. At the heart of it is what they call the 'Lekkasjemodellen' or the Leakage Model.

B: It's a really structured way to trace things back, isn't it? It essentially moves through three distinct levels to connect a physical leak all the way up to an organizational factor. The first level, 'Hva'—'What'—is simply the component that actually failed. Think a valve, a flange, a pipe.

A: Precisely. From there, it asks 'Hvem (utførende)'—'Who was executing?' This points to the frontline personnel involved, like operations staff or maintenance crews. Their actions, or inactions, directly relate to the component failure.

B: And then, the critical third level, 'Hvem (styrende)'—'Who was directing?' This is where we get into the organizational risk-influencing factors. These are the systemic elements that enable or hinder the frontline personnel's ability to prevent leaks. Things like 'Opplæring/kompetanse,' which means the training and competence necessary for safe job execution.

A: Right. Then there’s 'Prosedyrer, SJA, retningslinjer'—that's procedures, Safe Job Analysis, and guidelines. Essentially, the documented instructions for how work should be done correctly and safely. A breakdown here is a clear organizational influence on risk.

B: Exactly. And 'Planlegging, koordinering, organisering, kontroll' covers how tasks are managed, coordinated, structured, and overseen. This factor is crucial because it acts as a barrier function; effective control can prevent minor errors from escalating into a leak.

A: Which brings us to 'Design'—the physical equipment design itself. If the design inherently creates difficulties for operation or maintenance, that's an organizational factor influencing the likelihood of leaks. Lastly, 'PM-program/inspeksjon,' the Preventive Maintenance and inspection programs, directly impacts equipment integrity. A weak program means more unexpected failures. It's about moving from the symptom to the true systemic drivers.

A: So, we've identified these key organizational risk-influencing factors. But how do we actually quantify their impact? What's the logic to go from these indicators to a concrete risk assessment?

B: It's a four-step process. First, we have 'Rating' or 'Tilstandsbedømming'. We measure the state of each organizational factor using specific, measurable Organisatoriske Risikoindikatorer—ORIs. Think of them as snapshots of organizational health.

A: Okay, so the ORIs tell us if 'training' is good or bad. What's next for those scores?

B: Then comes 'Weighting' or 'Vekting'. Here, we determine how much each factor influences the leakage frequency. This draws on historical data and expert judgment to assign influence levels.

A: And then we combine them? Is that the aggregation step?

B: Precisely. 'Aggregation' is where a Bayesian Network, a BN, combines those ratings and weights. Crucially, it models the interdependencies—the 'samspillseffekter'—between factors. It's not just summing them up; it understands how they interact.

A: Which ultimately leads to the 'Risk Calculation', I assume?

B: That's right. The BN calculates the Expected Leakage Frequency, E(λ). This E(λ) is then fed into the main Quantitative Risk Analysis, or QRA, using sensitivity factors. That gives us the final change in total risk, like the Potential Loss of Lives.